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THE DAWN OF SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE (SOCINT)
Laura K. Donohue*
ABSTRACT
More information about citizens’ lives is recorded than ever before. Because
the data is digitized, it can be accessed, analyzed, shared, and combined with other
information to generate new knowledge. In a post-9/11 environment, the legal
standards impeding access to such data have fallen. Simultaneously, the advent of
global communications and cloud computing, along with network convergence, have
expanded the scope of information available. The U.S. government has begun to
collect and to analyze the associated data.
The result is the emergence of what can be termed “social intelligence”
(SOCINT), which this Article defines as the collection of digital data about social
relationships. What distinguishes this type of information from more traditional
forms of intelligence is that it draws from novel, digitized sources, such as metadata,
social media, and geolocational information, to construct a detailed picture of
networks—which themselves then serve as starting points for further analysis. The
telephony metadata program initiated under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
provides one prominent example. Numerous other initiatives are underway. These
collection programs carry significant risks. The construction of ZunZuneo
demonstrates how SOCINT can be used not just to understand social dynamics, but
to drive political, economic, or social change. As a constitutional matter, the broad
collection of social data is at cross-purposes with the Fourth Amendment, with
sobering consequences for individual rights. SOCINT thus ought to be treated as a
form of collection in its own right, subject to unique restrictions, and not as a
concomitant of other collection techniques.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology is altering the amount and type of information that can be
known about citizens, with profound implications for privacy. A vast quantity of
personal data is now digitized. Peoples’ lives are recorded by businesses;
employers; local, state, and federal agencies; friends and family; and themselves.
Cameras owned by private and public entities capture their movement in public
space. Where they go, what they buy, what they read, with whom they interact,
and the nature of their relationships with others are reflected in the digital sphere.
The recording of this information means three things. First, it can be
accessed. This is not a trivial consideration. Information that was not available
now is, and it exists in quantities that dwarf what previously could have been
known.1 Second, it can be analyzed at a level never before conceived.2 Advances
in mathematics and network design mean that sophisticated algorithms can be
applied to the information to generate new knowledge. In the process, those with
access to the data can learn things that people do not even know about
themselves. Third, and relatedly, because private information exists in a digital
sphere, other information can be combined to deepen the understanding of the
recorded data. Paralleling these changes, resource limitations that silently played
a restraining role are just as quietly slipping away.
1. See, e.g., Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010)
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443 (“Wal-Mart, a retail giant, handles more than 1
million customer transactions every hour, feeding databases estimated at more than 2.5
petabytes—the equivalent of 167 times the books in America’s Library of Congress . . . .”);
The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of
Things: Executive Summary, IDC (Apr. 2014), http://www.emc.com/leadership/digitaluniverse/2014iview/executive-summary.htm (stating the staggering amount of digital data has
reached new thresholds and noting the amount of data is doubling in size every two years).
2. See, e.g., Luca Cagliero & Alessandro Fiori, Knowledge Discovery from Online
Communities, in SOCIAL NETWORKING AND COMMUNITY BEHAVIOR MODELING: QUALITATIVE
AND QUANTITATIVE MEASURES 123, 124 (Maytham Safar & Khaled A. Mahdi eds., 2012).
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One of the most profound types of insight that can be generated from the
digital world relates to social networks: connections between individuals and
organizations that shed light on the social fabric, creating an object that can be
observed, analyzed, and potentially, manipulated.3 The structure can be gleaned
from electronic communications that range from telephones to computer-based
interactions, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), email, chat rooms, and
gaming networks.4 Social media sites such as Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram,
provide insight into connectedness between individuals, adding content that
reveals beliefs, interests, and predilections—as well as what individuals have
done and would like to do.5 Even traditional modes of communications, such as
letters sent through the ordinary post, are not immune—the government records
and digitizes envelope information. 6 Employment data, housing information,
political contributions, religious observance, and participation in organizations
that maintain a web presence offer further ways to document the extent and
qualities of social, political, and economic communities.7
The most salient question in analyzing social network data is not what can
be studied, but where to draw the line.8 So much information is now available
that one can construct a model of relationships within any conceivable
community, filling out the picture with the nature of the interests that tie
individuals together. Even relationships between regions or countries can be
explored, in the process providing details on the nature and quality of the
connections. The promise of “Big Data,” as it has come to be called, offers
insight into the broadest, and the most minute, aspects of the social order.9

3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Joe Pappalardo, NSA Data Mining: How It Works, POPULAR MECHANICS

(Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a9465/nsa-data-mining-how-itworks-15910146/ (noting the NSA PRISM program collects information from “digital photos,
stored data, file transfers, emails, chats, videos, and video conferencing”).
5. See Cagliero & Fiori, supra note 2, at 124–25.
6. See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snailmail.html?_r=o.
7. See Mary Edwards, Community Guide to Development Impact Analysis, WISC.EDU,
http://www.lic.wisc.edu/shapingdane/facilitation/all_resources/impacts/ana
lysis_socio.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
8. See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, When the Web’s Chaos Takes an Ugly Turn, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/technology/a-reddit-forum-promptsquestions-of-where-to-draw-a-line.html.
9. Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal, HARV. MAG. (Apr. 2014),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal.
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Numerous sectors are keen to take advantage of the opportunities offered
by these new technologies.10 Industry is capitalizing on it, using the information
generated to sell products and services that customers did not even realize they
wanted. So when Amazon.com suggests, “other books you might like,” it turns
out, you do.11
Individuals are using it to connect to friends, and friends of friends, finding
others with similar interests and creating worldwide communities. The social
aspect of such networks offers connectedness. It offers opportunities to learn. It
provides individuals with the chance to explore worlds that previously would not
be accessible.
The government, in turn, sees in Big Data opportunity for the more
effective provision of services. 12 It looks to it as a way to conduct better
investigations for law enforcement purposes. 13 And it seeks to realize the
potential of not just detecting, but preventing future threats to national security.
The foreign intelligence realm, in particular, has begun to shift its emphasis
to Big Data as a way to identify and to respond to threats to national security.
What is being created is a form of “social intelligence,” or SOCINT, which is
broadly defined here as the collection of digital data about social relationships.14
Notably, the U.S. intelligence community does not appear to separate digital
social intelligence from other forms of information.15 Nor has Congress sought

10. Boris Dzhingarov, Social Media: How Major Industries Take Advantage of the
Emerging Content Platform, SOCIALNOMICS (June 24, 2015), http://www.social
nomics.net/2015/06/24/social-media-how-major-industries-take-advantage-of-the-emergingcontent-platform/.
11. See Thomas H. Davenport, Leandro Dalle Mule & John Lucker, Know What Your
Customers Want Before They Do, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2011), http://hbr.org
/2011/12/know-what-your-customers-want-before-they-do; Stephen Goldsmith, Big Data,
Analytics and a New Era of Efficiency in Government, GOVERNING (May 22, 2013),
http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-big-data-analytics-government-efficiency.html.
12. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on the Big Data
Bandwagon: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, and Access
to Government Information, 66 ME. L. REV. 397, 398 (2014).
14. SOCINT is used here as a potential intelligence moniker akin to HUMINT (human
intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), or OSINT (open source intelligence). For a list of
the various sources of intelligence collection, see Intelligence Collection Disciplines, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/disciplines (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
15. Instead, information that reveals social relationships is gleaned from other types of
intelligence gathering, such as OSINT (open source intelligence), and SIGINT, which
includes both COMINT (communications intelligence, i.e., information gleaned from
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specifically to legislate in this area. To the contrary, the government has gone
through legal gymnastics to read the authority to collect certain forms of
SOCINT in a manner compatible with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act.16 To the extent that SOCINT is not addressable through the current statutory
regime, Executive Order 12333 and the associated directives remain the
framing.17
Changes in foreign intelligence collection, as well as global
communications structures, have facilitated the extension of intelligence
gathering to SOCINT. In the former area, since October 2001, there has been a
weakening of the legal standards limiting access to citizens’ data.18 In the latter

conversations between individuals), and ELINT (electronic intelligence, i.e., data obtained
from electronic signals that are not themselves a direct part of communications). See
Headquarters, Dep’t of US Army, Open Source Intelligence, Army Techniques Publication
No.
2-22.9
(July
10,
2012),
available
at
https://fas.org/
irp/doddir/army/atp2-22-9.pdf; Intelligence Collection Disciplines, supra note 14 (defining
SIGINT); RICHARD L. BERNARD, NSA, ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) AT NSA 1
(2009),
https://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/
misc/elint.pdf (defining ELINT); see also KERRY PATTON, SOCIOCULTURAL INTELLIGENCE: A
NEW DISCIPLINE IN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES 11–12 (2010). But see David Omand,
Understanding Digital Intelligence: A British View, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE ERA OF CYBER ESPIONAGE (Eugenie de Silva, ed., forthcoming
January 2016) (distinguishing digital intelligence); David Omand, Jamie Bartlett, & Carl
Miller, Introducing Social Media Intelligence, 27 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 801,
803–23 (2012) (distinguishing social media intelligence).
16. See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 836–38 (2014) [hereinafter Donohue,
Metadata Collection] (discussing redefinition of “relevant” to allow for the bulk collection of
telephony metadata under FISA’s business records provision); see also CHARLIE SAVAGE,
POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 197, 201–201, 205–206 (2015)
(discussing redefinition of “relevant,” “facility,” and “target” to allow for the broad collection
of social data under separate sections of FISA).
17. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 1981 (Dec. 4, 1981).
18. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, § 6001(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012));
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272,
282 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2012)); EDWARD C. LIU, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
(FISA) EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015, at 1–2 (2011), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40138.pdf; see also generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE
COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY (2008); Laura K. Donohue,
Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015) [hereinafter Donohue, International Content]; Donohue,
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area, network convergence and the structure of global communications have
further eroded barriers to collection. It used to be that foreign countries
communicated with their agents over specialized network.19 Human intelligence
reports, military dispatches, diplomatic instructions, and signals data were
relayed through individualized routes.20 To intercept information, agents had to
find a way to break into these systems.
Foreign countries’ communications, however, are no longer restricted to
separate networks.21 Instead, the same systems used daily by ordinary citizens
carry foreign intelligence traffic.22 Simultaneously, the threat posed by non-state
actors has increased.23 To locate and monitor these threats, the government has
increasingly focused on systems carrying citizens’ private communications. 24
Another aspect of network convergence expands the privacy interests implicated:
it is not just one kind of communication carried via the Internet, but telephone,
video, signals, and data all travel over its paths.25 As the so-called “Internet of
Things” takes hold, the privacy interests will only deepen.26
The structure of global communications themselves has also changed.
Traditionally, domestic communications were provided with a higher level of
protection than those carried internationally.27 But new technologies have broken
down the distinction, with the result that a significant amount of domestic
communications traverse U.S. borders, at which point they become subject to
collection. 28 In the face of cloud computing, even static data, such as

Metadata Collection, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community—An Historical
Overview, FAS (Feb. 23, 1996), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html (detailing a brief history
of the development of the United States intelligence community and surveillance of foreign
communications).
20. See id.
21. See RICHARD A. CLARKE, ET. AL, THE NSA REPORT: LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A
CHANGING WORLD xi–xii (2014).
22. See id.
23. See id. at 27–30.
24. See id. at xii.
25. See Mark Elmore, Comment, Big Brother Where Art Thou, Electronic Surveillance
and the Internet: Carving Away the Fourth Amendment Privacy Protections, 32 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1053, 1054-56 (2001).
26. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 132 (2014).
27. See Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 766–67.
28. See id.

2015]

The Dawn of Social Intelligence (SOCINT)

1067

photographs, papers, and financial records, may be held on servers overseas.29
In brief, an increasing amount of information about individuals’ lives is
digitized. It can be accessed, analyzed, and combined with other data to generate
insight into society. 30 Simultaneously, changes in the foreign intelligence
collection and global communications structures mean that the government now
has broad access to this information.31
This Article argues that the collection of digital social data, which can be
combined with other information and queried to produce knowledge, and which
is vulnerable to manipulation, represents a new form of intelligence. In the post9/11 world, the growth of SOCINT carries significant risks and has catapulted
the country along a dangerous path. In taking this direction, the government is
undermining bedrock principles on which the United States was founded.
The Article begins by distinguishing SOCINT from other forms of
intelligence gathering by positing three core characteristics: (a) the collection of
non-traditional forms of digital data with deep implications for citizens’ privacy,
(b) the function of SOCINT as a starting point for analysis of the social order,
and (c) the potential use of the data to neutralize actors or to effect large-scale
social, political, and economic change.32
The Article next recognizes the absence of a sufficient statutory framing for
the collection of this type of data, providing an example of how one recent
program, the collection of telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 33 It
then details some of the social intelligence programs currently being conducted
under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, as well as Executive Order
12333, highlighting in the process the depth of the privacy interests involved.34
The Article then turns to the dangers of SOCINT.35 The nonstatic nature of
29. See Axel Amback & Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the
Constitution: Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic
Abroad, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 321 (2015).
30. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does
on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter Greenwald, XKeyscore],
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-on
line-data/print.
31. See id.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See id.
35. See infra Part IV.
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social networks and their vulnerability to manipulation increase the risks of
allowing broad access to social network data.36 With little regard for political
boundaries, instantaneous communication, and the potential leverage of massive
human resources, social networks can be used to affect political, social, and
economic change. The United States Agency for International Development’s
(USAID) effort to launch ZunZuneo in Cuba provides an example of how the
U.S. government has tried to construct and use social networks for political
aims.37
From this, the Article highlights the constitutional concerns evinced in the
course of social intelligence collection, noting that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment was to eliminate general warrants.38 These instruments were used to
collect information prior to any evidence of wrongdoing, with the attendant
danger that the information—particularly information about relationships—could
then be used to head off opposition. 39 The case of Paul Revere provides a
powerful example of the strength of SOCINT and its potentially profound
impact.40 The underlying rights questions also matter. The collection of social
data may impact qualities otherwise protected by liberal democratic states, such
as the importance of solitude and self-determination, the need to allow for
democratic deliberation, and the attendant rights of freedom of speech and
freedom of association.41
The Article concludes by recognizing that whatever one may think about
SOCINT, the fact that it is such a powerful tool—and one replete with underlying
constitutional risks—means, at a minimum, that it deserves direct analysis and
attention and not to be treated as a concomitant of other forms of intelligence
gathering.42 What is needed is a stronger statutory framing, removing SOCINT
from the sole domain of Executive Order 12333, or as an ancillary to FISA §702.
II. DEFINING SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE
Social intelligence (SOCINT), the collection of digital data about social
relationships, differs from other forms of intelligence gathering in three critical
ways.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
See id.
See infra Part V.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Part VI.
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First, SOCINT relies on non-traditional, digitized data, which includes
social media, communications metadata, and geolocational information. The first
category further subdivides into at least three areas: social sites, collaborative
platforms, and interest-group formation.
Social media sites like Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Snapchat, as
well as dating sites like Match.com, eHarmony, and Lovestruck, are designed to
create connections between people. 43 These sites are a product of the digital
revolution, and they have attracted an enormous amount of attention. Match.com
started in 1995.44 By 2004, it had registered more than 42 million users.45 It now
has approximately 24 million users at any one time.46 It is only one of myriad
dating sites. According to the company, some forty million Americans regularly
use online dating services.47 In January 2004, Facebook did not even exist.48 It
formally became Facebook.com in August 2005. 49 Just one decade later, on
August 27, 2015, one billion users signed onto the site.50 According to founder
and CEO Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook maintains 1.5 billion monthly users.51
Social media reaches beyond sites designed to create networks to include
collaborative platforms—i.e., websites and apps that enable people to create and
to share content.52 Sites that may not appear on their face as serving in a social
43. See Social Media, MERRIAM-WESBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (defining social media as
“forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging)
through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal
messages, and other content (as videos)).
44. See About Match.com, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/help/aboutus.
aspx?lid=4 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
45. It’s a Record Breaker; Guinness Says Match.com Leads the World in Online Dating,
SOURCEWIRE NEWS DISTRIBUTION (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.sourcewire.com
/news/20013/it-s-a-record-breaker-guinness-says-match-com-leads-the#.Vi99yMuqdfQ.
46. Online Dating Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://www.statisticbrain.com/online-dating-statistics/ (compiling statistics regarding online or
Internet dating from Reuters, Herald News, PC World, and the Washington Post).
47. Meredith Broussard, Dating Stats You Should Know, MATCH.COM (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.match.com/magazine/article/4671/; see also Online Dating Statistics, supra note
46.
48. See Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia.
49. Id.
50. Julia Greenberg, 1 Billion People Used Facebook on Monday, WIRED (Aug. 27,
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/1-billion-people-used-facebook-monday/.
51. Id.
52. See Social Media, supra note 43 (defining social media as “forms of electronic
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network capacity may act similarly to bring people together. Google+, for
instance, tries to enable “real-life sharing” via the Internet.53 It has 11 million
followers.54 Wikipedia, a free encyclopedia derived solely through collaborative
editing, brings together communities of interest around the topics listed, with
thousands of edits entered hourly.55
Social media also includes sites dedicated to the formation of interest
groups. Initially, many of these simply provided users with access to products or
services, such as music, photos, news stories, or games. But some have now
evolved to build networks through common interests. Spotify users, for instance,
can now share playlists. 56 At Shutterfly, groups can be formed, giving the
members access to the same images and announcements, 57 while at Reddit,
individuals can subscribe to subreddits to follow and to help drive the top
stories.58 Even gaming communities can now come together while in the game
itself, communicating with players half a world away. Thus, Overwolf features “a
wide variety of epic apps, made by gamers,” to import social media. 59 The
company promotes a JavaScript based software development kit (SDK) called
KAIGOS (Kick Ass In Game Operating System), to encourage gamers to
develop yet more apps for in-game social networking.60
What is notable about social media sites is that they take private
relationships and put them online. Beyond this, they create new relationships,

communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging) through which users
create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content
(as videos)).
53. Google+
Features,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/intl/en/+/learnmore/
circles/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
54. Google+, GOOGLE, https://plus.google.com/+googleplus/about (last visited Nov. 1,
2015).
55. Wikipedia: Introduction, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Introduction (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
56. See About Us, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/about-us/contact/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2015); How Do I Share Music With My Friends?, SPOTIFY,
https://support.spotify.com/us/learn-more/guides/#!/article/sharing-music (last visited Oct. 31,
2015).
57. See Share Sites, SHUTTERFLY, https://www.shutterfly.com/sites/create/welcome.
sfly?fid=7e3ac6c333a10e40 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
58. See Jacob O’Gara, Reddit 101: A Beginner’s Guide to the Front Page of the Internet,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/reddit-101/.
59. About Overwolf, OVERWOLF, http://www.overwolf.com/about-overwolf/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2015).
60. Id.
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which become digitally imprinted on the electronic sphere. So entire
communities that never before existed have now come into being. And because
they are digitized, they are accessible.
Social media is not the only non-traditional form of data that contributes to
SOCINT. It also may derive from communications metadata—that is, patterns in
relationships that can be generated by paying attention to what individuals do in
the course of their daily lives. Revealing whom one happens to call has not
traditionally been regarded as particularly intimate data.61 But as the telephone
has become more central to our lives, and the volume of calls between
individuals has exponentially increased, more and more information can be
gleaned from the length and frequency of contact, as well as patterns in calls.62
Private details about individuals’ lives, and the broader networks within which
they operate, can be uncovered by looking at other forms of communications
metadata as well, such as email, text messaging, Skype, instant chats, and
Internet browsing.63
Another new source of social information centers on geolocational data,
which can be gleaned from a variety of sources, such as radio-frequency
identification (RFID) chips, global positioning systems, trunk identifier
information, license plate readers, or CCTV paired with biometric identification
systems.64 This type of information can reveal not just where an individual goes,
and when they go there, but who they are with when they do so.65 These novel
forms of data can be used to map social relationships.
Second, SOCINT differs from traditional forms of intelligence in that it can
serve as a starting point for socio-cultural knowledge generation.66 Owing to its

61. See Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 863–65 (discussing Smith v.
Maryland where the Supreme Court found an individual does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from one’s telephone).
62. Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone
Metadata, WEB POLICY (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-thesensitivity-of-telephone-metadata/.
63. See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Big Data, Metadata, and Traffic Analysis: What the
NSA is Really Doing, ITWORLD (July 26, 2013), http://www.itworld.com/
article/2829511/big-data/big-data—metadata—and-traffic-analysis—what-the-nsa-is-reallydoing.html.
64. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 420–37 (2012).
65. See id.
66. See PATTON, supra note 15, at xiii; see also LEEELLEN FRIEDLAND, GARY W. SHAEFF
& JESSICA GLICKEN TURNLEY, SOCIO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A NEW INTELLIGENCE
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volume, the sophistication of the algorithms that can be run on data, the types of
information with which it can be combined (because it is both ordered and
digitized), and the type of knowledge that can be generated, SOCINT goes well
beyond what would have been digestible in a world of human intelligence
(HUMINT) or even signal intelligence (SIGINT). Insights about which even the
objects of the analysis may have little or no knowledge can be gleaned. In
contrast, in traditional SIGINT, the parties to the communication are aware of
what has been said.67 But those who form the nodes in SOCINT may be utterly
ignorant of what can be gleaned from their behavior, as well as their relationship
to other individuals and organizations in the network.
The third distinguishing factor of SOCINT is that the data itself can be used
to effect widespread political, economic, or social change. 68 This is primarily
done through using the data collected to identify critical nodes in the networks,
which can then be neutralized, pressured, or otherwise persuaded to act in ways
that use or fundamentally change the surrounding social network. It can do this
because of the nature of digital networks. Social media provides a rich and
diverse source of information that can be disseminated quickly, with little regard
for geopolitical boundaries. Communication among participants can happen
almost instantaneously, outside traditional regulatory regimes. And it can involve
large numbers of people, which means that significant human resources can be
mobilized.
Because of these unique characteristics (the collection of novel forms of
digital data with deep privacy implications, the use of SOCINT as a starting point
for knowledge production, and the potential use of social intelligence to
neutralize opposition or to effect political, economic, or social change), the
power encapsulated in SOCINT goes well beyond the collection of other forms
of intelligence. It constitutes a new type of knowledge.
The collection of this data has massive implications. The power of social
networks is gradually becoming apparent.69 One need look no further than the
2001 convergence of protestors in Manilla, which prompted the Philippine

PARADIGM, REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE AT THE MITRE CORPORATION MCLEAN, VIRGINIA,
SEPTEMBER
12,
2006
(June
2007),
available
at
http://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07_1220.pdf.
67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
68. See discussion infra Part IV.
69. See Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public
Sphere, and Political Change, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/2010-12-20/political-power-social-media.
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Congress to change its course and to impeach Philippine President Joseph
Estrada.70 In Spain, demonstrations generated by text messaging resulted in the
departure of Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar.71 The overthrow of the
autocratic governments in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, known broadly as the
“Arab Spring,” similarly relied on social networks for their execution.72 The risk
is that individuals who can map and control such networks can accomplish
massive changes in political, economic, and social structures.
III. ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT STATUTORY FRAMING
The framing for U.S. foreign intelligence collection falls into two broad
(and at times overlapping) categories: the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (as amended),73 and Executive Order 12333, first introduced by President
Reagan in 1981. 74 The former initially addressed only electronic
communications. 75 Congress later expanded the statute to cover physical
searches,76 the use of pen register and trap and trace devices,77 and the acquisition
of business records.78 Post-9/11, the business records provision was altered to

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See generally PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., OPENING CLOSED REGIMES: WHAT WAS THE

ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING THE ARAB SPRING? (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2595096.
73. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)).
74. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 1981 (Dec. 4, 1981).
75. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92
Stat. 1783, 1786–88.
76. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, § 807, 108
Stat. 3423, 3443–53 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829) (physical searches).
77. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601,
112 Stat. 2396, 2404–10 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846) (pen register and trap
and trace devices).
78. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602,
112 Stat. 2396, 2410–12 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1863) (business records).
Various other amendments have been made. The USA PATRIOT Act, for instance, Section
207 changed the duration of certain FISA authorization orders; Section 208 increased the
number of FISC judges to 11; Section 214 amended FISA pen register and trap and trace
provisions; Section 218 changed the purpose of electronic & physical searches; and Section
504 authorized coordination between intelligence and law enforcement. ITRPA subsequently
added a “lone wolf” provision via § 6001. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1801(b)(1) (2012)).
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allow the government to obtain tangible goods.79 Together, these authorities are
referred to as “Traditional FISA.”
In 2008, the Administration convinced Congress that alterations to FISA
were required to take account of the global nature of communications. 80 The
problem, the government argued, was that communications previously
considered international, and thus not subject to FISA, might pass through the
United States, thus forcing the intelligence community to go to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court for intercept permission. Accordingly, the
government altered the statute to construct what is referred to as “Modern FISA,”
which gives the government greater leeway when the target of the intercept is
believed to be a non-U.S. person based outside the United States.81
FISA does not directly address the collection of social intelligence. 82
Instead, efforts have been made to shoehorn communications metadata collection
into the business records, as well as pen register and trap and trace provisions, of
Traditional FISA. 83 Such efforts proved ill founded. At the same time, the
intelligence community has created collection programs under Modern FISA that
include significant amounts of information about U.S. citizens’ social networks.84
Outside of the FISA regime, Executive Order 12333, and its associated
directives, provide the framing for surveillance programs that are heavily
dependent on digitized social data. 85 The order, however, lacks sufficient
particularity for handling the unique challenges of this type of information.
A. Telephony Metadata Collection Under Section 215
In June 2013, the Guardian published a copy of an order issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 86 requiring Verizon to turn over “an

79. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215,
115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) (tangible goods).
80. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
81. See id.
82. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)).
83. See discussion infra Part III(A)–(B).
84. See id.
85. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 1981 (Dec. 4, 1981).
86. Verizon Forced to Hand over Telephone Data—Full Court Ruling, THE GUARDIAN
(June
5,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/
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electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or
‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon for communications (i) between the
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local
telephone calls.”87 The order heralded the intelligence community’s entry into
social intelligence collection in all but name. To find the authority to collect
telephony metadata, the government interpreted the law in a manner that
stretches credulity.
When the order first reached the public domain, there was some confusion
over its legal justification. 88 Traditionally, the intelligence community had to
demonstrate that the person about whom it was obtaining information was a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power before collection could
commence.89
What the Verizon order suggested was that collection did not have to be
particularized.90 Intelligence agencies were collecting massive amounts of data to
look for potential threats to the United States.91 The order, moreover, explicitly
included telephone calls “wholly within the United States, including local
telephone calls.” 92 Although previously a higher level of protection had been
extended to the collection of domestic content,93 under the terms of the order, no
such distinguishing factor appeared to be applied in this case.94
One clue to the order’s presumed legal nexus appeared in the phrase
“tangible things.” 95 The term hearkens back to a clause added to the 1978

jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order.
87. In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things
From Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. 13-80, at 2 (FISA Ct. 2013) [hereinafter In re
Application
of
F.B.I],
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/
interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order.
88. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
89. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)).
90. See In Re Application of F.B.I., supra note 87.
91. See Based on What We Know, Is the NSA Verizon Request Legal?, NPR.ORG (June
15, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/06/15/191619038/based-on-whatwe-know-is-the-nsa-verizon-request-legal.
92. See In Re Application of F.B.I., supra note 87.
93. Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 806.
94. See id. at 803–04.
95. See In Re Application of F.B.I., supra note 87.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in the aftermath of 9/11. 96 But
before the iconic USA PATRIOT Act weakened the constraints on the
intelligence community, this section of FISA was known as the business records
provision, introduced in response to an earlier terrorist attack.97
In 1995, a right-wing extremist, Timothy McVeigh, placed a Ryder rental
truck packed with a fertilizer bomb outside the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City. 98 The explosion left 168 people dead and hundreds more
injured.99 During the investigation, prosecutors were not clear on whether they
had the authority to obtain McVeigh’s business records related to the truck rental,
a storage unit that he maintained in Kansas, and his locker in Arizona. 100
Although the attack was domestic, Congress altered FISA to authorize the
production of certain types of business records related to individuals suspected of
being foreign powers or agents of a foreign power.101
Under the statute, applications for a court order had to “specify that . . . the
records concerned [were] sought for an investigation [to gather foreign
intelligence information or an investigation concerning international terrorism];
and there [were] specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.”102 To limit the reach of orders, any records sought had to be for “an
investigation to gather foreign intelligence information or an investigation
concerning international terrorism.”103 The application established the potential
involvement of the target in illegal activities.104 Congress required intelligence

96. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215,
115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)).
97. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §
602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1863 (2012)).
98. Douglas O. Linder, The Oklahoma City Bombing & the Trial of Timothy McVeigh
(UMKC School of Law, Faculty Project 2006), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/mcveigh/mcveighaccount.html.
99. Id.
100. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1329 (2004) (noting that in 1998 FISA was extended to include the kind
of business records relevant to the Oklahoma City bombing investigation).
101. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §
602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012)).
102. Id. at § 602, 112 Stat. at 2411.
103. Id.
104. Id. As with the other provisions of traditional FISA, Congress assigned the terms
“foreign power,” “agent of a foreign power,” “foreign intelligence information,” and
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agencies to follow the same steps as those taken with regard to electronic
surveillance—submitting an application to FISC to obtain an order, which then
compels the company to hand over the records.105
The statute limited the types of businesses on which the court could serve
orders to include only common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage
facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. 106 Even so, the number of entities
implicated was considerable. Common carriers includes any individual or
company that transports people or things on regular routes, at set rates. 107 It
covers buses, taxis, commercial airplanes, passenger trains, cruise ships,
railroads, and trucking companies. 108 According to the DOJ, “places of public
accommodation,” in turn, include more than 5 million establishments in the
United States, “such as restaurants, hotels, theaters, convention centers, retail
stores, shopping centers, dry cleaners, laundromats, pharmacies, doctors’ offices,
hospitals, museums, libraries, parks, zoos, amusement parks, private schools, day
care centers, health spas, and bowling alleys.”109 With regard to storage facilities,
by 2015, there were more than 48,500 units, constituting the fastest growing
segment of the commercial real estate industry over the past four decades. 110
Finally, as of 2014, car rental companies were in more than 21,000 locations,
offering consumers access to more than 2 million cars.111 These companies reach
into Americans’ daily lives, offering insight into matters ranging from medical
issues and intimate relationships to financial conditions and travels.

“international terrorism” the same meanings as employed in relation to electronic surveillance.
Compare Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §101(a)–(c), (e),
92 Stat. 1783, 1783–84 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 1801 (2012)), with Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)).
105. Compare Pub. L. No. 95-511, §102, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786–88, with Pub. L. No. 105272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12.
106. See Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12.
107. Id. at § 602, 112 Stat. at 2411.
108. See What is a Common Carrier?, FINDLAW, http://injury.findlaw.com/torts-andpersonal-injuries/what-is-a-common-carrier.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
109. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Title III Highlights, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov
/t3hilght.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
110. Fact
Sheet,
SELF
STORAGE
ASS’N,
http://www.selfstorage.org/ssa/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutSSA/Factsheet/default.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015). About 10.85 million households in the United States rent a selfstorage unit. Id.
111. See 2014 U.S. Car Rental Market: Fleet, Locations and Revenue, AUTO RENTAL
NEWS, http://www.autorentalnews.com/fileviewer/2014.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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Despite claiming the necessity of the business records provision, the
executive branch made little use of it, filing an application with FISC only once
between 1998 and 2001.112
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act expanded what types of
information could be obtained under the business records provision.113 The new
clause authorized the FBI to apply for an order from FISC “requiring the
production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents,
and other items).”114 This meant that the government could acquire any record—
be it business or personal.115
Congress also eliminated the restrictions on the types of commercial
entities that could be served with an order.116 Instead of just common carriers,
public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities,
orders could now be served on Internet service providers, grocery stores,
libraries, booksellers, hotels, universities, and pharmacies—almost any
institution or company.117 The Department of Justice quickly interpreted this to
mean any company with a domestic office, as well as any data in the company’s
“possession, custody, or control,” even if it was stored overseas.118
The legislation, in addition, eliminated the requirement that the government
demonstrate “specific and articulable facts” to the court that the target was a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.119 To the contrary, it only required
112. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS
iii
(March
2007),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703a/
final.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF § 215].
113. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215,
115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)); U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF §
215, supra note 112, at iii–iv.
114. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (emphasis added).
115. See id.
116. Compare Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861–1862 (2012)).
117. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at; U.S. D.O.J. REVIEW OF § 215, supra note
112, at 7.
118. See Cindy Cohn & Katitza Rodriguez, Department of Justice Misdirection on Cloud
Computing and Privacy, EFF (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012
/01/department-justice-misdirection-cloud-computing-and-privacy.
119. Compare Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Pub. L. No. 105-272, §
602, 112 Stat. at 2411–12, and U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF § 215, supra note 112, at 8.
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that the person seeking the information state the “records concerned are sought
for an authorized investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.” 120 Once the government provided its
assurance, FISC became bound to grant the order. 121 By eliminating the link
between the records and the target of the investigation, the government could
collect information about other people, not personally suspected of any
wrongdoing, as long as it related to an authorized investigation.122
The government filed its first application for a tangible things order in May
2004. 123 That year, DOJ obtained seven orders. 124 In February 2005, it began
using the authority in conjunction with pen register or trap and trace orders to
obtain telephone subscriber information.125 In 2005, the court issued 141 of the
combination orders. 126 The types of information obtained included driver’s
license records, hotel records, apartment leases, credit card records, and
subscriber information.127
The pressure to harvest social intelligence pushed the government past the
statutory language that governed the acquisition of business records.128 For the
government to obtain an order, it must have “reasonable grounds to believe that
the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287–88.
Id.
See id.
U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF § 215, supra note 112, at 17.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 67. The DOJ was quick to say that it had not obtained library or bookstore
records, medical records, or gun sale records. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Calls on Congress to Renew Vital Provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act, JUSTICE.GOV (April 5, 2005), available at http://fas.org/irp/
news/2005/04/doj040505.html.
128. For a more detailed exposition of this point, see Donohue, Metadata Collection,
supra note 16, at 802. See also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d
Cir. 2015); PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 171–72 (2014)
[hereinafter PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 215 REPORT] (agreeing in
conclusion). But see generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19,
2006), available at https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/doj11906wp.pdf (arguing legal
justifications for the NSA program).
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threat assessment).” 129 The word “relevant” played a crucial role. The
government’s contention, which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
eventually accepted, was that all metadata was potentially relevant to
investigations.130 Therefore, the government could collect all records.131
The error in this logic is clear. Specifically, why would Congress bother to
use the word “relevant” if all records are relevant? That is, under this
interpretation, nothing would be irrelevant. And it would not just be telephony
metadata that the government could obtain under the government’s interpretation,
but all records, such as those related to banking or finance, education, and
consumer purchases.132
The government’s statutory interpretation similarly read the “reasonable
grounds” requirement in the law out of existence.133 If all records were relevant,
then there would be no further limitation to only certain records for which it was
reasonable to think that they related to the collection regime.134 At the same time,
the government’s interpretation treated investigations as a class—not as a
particular investigation already under way, as required by statute.135 Further, the
government collected information as part of a threat assessment—which was
explicitly forbidden by statute.136
The program ran counter to other aspects of the statute as well. The
legislation required, for instance, that the government be able to otherwise obtain
the tangible goods being sought via subpoena duces tecum. 137 A prosecutor,
however, would not be able to convene a grand jury and to begin collecting
telephony metadata, just to see if there was any illegal activity afoot 138 The
Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that subpoenas may not be used for fishing

129. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109177, § 106, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012)).
130. See, e.g., In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, at 14 (FISA Ct. 2015), available at
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2015-75%20Misc%201501%20Opinion%20and%20Order_0.pdf.
131. See id.
132. Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 841.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 849.
136. Id. at 846–47.
137. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D) (2012).
138. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 846 F. Supp. 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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expeditions.139
The telephony metadata program eviscerated the provisions of the statute
that laid out what was required for installation and use of pen register or trap and
trace devices.140 The former is a “device or process which records or decodes
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information”—i.e., the numbers dialed
by a telephone.141 The latter “captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling information.”142 That portion of FISA also allows the government to
obtain other, related information.143 It must first, though, make a particularized
showing in relation to the target about whom the information is going to be
collected.144 A judicial decision must be made prior to collecting information ,145
and heightened protections are given to U.S. persons.146
By using the business records provision to obtain the same information—
without any evidence of a connection to a foreign power or particularized
showing of wrongdoing—the government performed an end-run around other
statutory provisions.147
Despite the statutory violations, the NSA secretly collected telephony
metadata in bulk. 148 The argument it offered to the FISC was that it was
necessary to do this for national security purposes.149 Both secretly and in the
public debate that later ensued, the government offered a haystack rationale: it
was necessary to build a haystack to find individuals who posed a threat.150 In

139. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (“Grand juries are not
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions, nor may they select targets of investigation
out of malice or an intent to harass.”).
140. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
142. Id. § 3127(4).
143. See 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1)–(2).
144. See id. § 1842(d)(2)(A).
145. See id. § 1842(d)(1)–(2).
146. Id. § 1842(c)(2).
147. See id. § 1842(a)(2) (noting the authority under § 1842 is in addition to the authority
to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA).
148. In re Production of Tangible Things from (Redacted), No. BR 08-13, at 1–2 (FISA
Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at https://www.eff.org/document/br-08-13-order-3-2-09-finalredactedex-ocr-0.
149. Id. at 2.
150. See Scott Neuman, Bush-Era NSA Chief Defends PRISM, Phone Metadata
Collection,
NPR
(June
09,
2013),
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
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this case, the haystack was constructed of social relationships, the inspection of
which might provide a clue to threats to U.S. national security. It was the
structure itself that had to be constructed to generate information.151
B. Additional Social Intelligence Programs
In June 2015 Congress responded to the public furor that accompanied the
revelation that the intelligence community had been collecting Americans’
telephone records by giving the government 180 days to end bulk telephony
collection under Section 215.152 This program, however, is only one of myriad
ways in which the government is attempting to assimilate Big Data to reveal
deeper insights into the social fabric.153
Starting in October 2001, President Bush operated a surveillance program
entirely outside any statutory structure. Stellarwind collected telephone and
Internet metadata, as well as telephone and Internet content.154 It was so secret,

way/2013/06/09/190092800/bush-era-nsa-chief-defends-prism-phone-meta-data-collection.
151. See id.
152. See USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, §§ 103, 109, 129 Stat. 268, 272,
276 (giving the government 180 days to end bulk collection of telephone records).
153. Also note, the Section 215 telephony metadata program accounts for only 41 orders
issued under Section 215, leaving 711 orders, still classified, potentially untouched. See
LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE (forthcoming 2016). Additional
telephony metadata programs exist. In January 2015, for instance, the DEA announced that it
had been collecting telephony metadata between the United States and up to 116 different
countries—in this case, apparently without any statutory authorization. Brad Heath, U.S.
Secretly Tracked Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephone-surveillanceoperation/70808616/.
154. President George W. Bush, Memorandum, Authorization for Specified Electronic
Surveillance Activities During a Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism
Within the United States (Oct. 4, 2001), cited in Office of the Inspector General, National
Security Agency Central Security Service, ST-09-0002 Working Draft 1, 17–18 (2009),
available at http://perma.cc/M3FC- QMHN. The Administration has publicly confirmed the
inclusion of Internet and telephony metadata, and telephony content, as part of the program,
but not Internet content. See Press Release, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Announces
the Declassification of the Existence of Collection Activities Authorized by President George
W. Bush Shortly After the Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Dec. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/991-dniannounces-the-declassification-of-the-exisitence-of-collection-activities-authorized-bypresident-george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-attacks-of-september-11,2001;
Unclassified
Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency, Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No.
08-cv-4373-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Fleisch Declaration], available at
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/12/21/fleisch2013jewelshubert
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that for the first few years, the NSA itself was not allowed to read the Office of
Legal Counsel’s (OLC) assessment of the legal grounds for the program, which
had been provided to the President and Vice President.155 At that time, some of
the attorneys at OLC had an anomalous view of executive power—positions that
OLC has since repudiated.
When questions were raised question about the legality and
constitutionality of portions of Stellarwind, a concerted effort was made to force
the collection of massive amounts of data into the existing FISA framework. The
Internet metadata program was transferred to portions of the statute governing
pen register and trap and trace devices.156 It did so by reading “relevant” in the
same way that it later interpreted Section 215,157 stretching the meaning of the
statutory language beyond common sense. Although the Internet metadata
collection program formally ended in December 2011, 158 international Internet
metadata collection appears to have continued through a program called “EVIL
OLIVE.”159
To incorporate the collection of other social network data into FISA’s
framing, the government re-defined “facility” to mean not a particular phone

.pdf (using language identical to DNI press release); see also Second Redacted Declaration of
Steven G. Bradbury, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 511 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C.
2007)
(No.
06-00214
HHK)),
available
at
https://www.aclu.org
/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_2nd_declaration_steven_bradbury.pdf. For further
discussion of these programs, see DONOHUE, supra note 153; SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra
note 16.
155. SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 16, at 184.
156. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion (Redacted), 6
(FISA
Ct.),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/
CLEANEDPRTT%202.pdf; see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Opinion and
Order (Redacted),
2 (FISA Ct.), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents
/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf (original order); see also 50 USC §§1841–1846; Press
Release, Dir. of National Intelligence, DNI Announces the Declassification of the Existence
of Collection Activities Authorized by President George W. Bush Shortly After Attacks of
September
11,
2001
(Dec.
21,
2013),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/991-dniannounces-the-declassification-of-the-exisitence-of-collection-activities-authorized-bypresident-george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-attacks-of-september-11,%202001.
157. See FISC Order, supra note 156, at 29–31; see also Donohue, Metadata Collection,
supra note 16, at 836–38; SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 16, at 197.
158. See DONOHUE, supra note 153.
159. Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA is Still Harvesting Your
Online Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection.
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number or email address, but an entire gateway or cable head, 160 even as it
transformed the meaning of “target” from relating to a particular individual, to
entire groups, organizations, or networks.161 This last alteration meant that the
government could use the roving wiretap provisions inserted into FISA post-9/11
to wiretap any phone number or email address without first approaching the
court.162
Other efforts to collect social intelligence have occurred under Modern
FISA. As aforementioned, in 2008, the Administration convinced Congress to
pass the FAA to give it more flexibility to intercept international traffic. 163
Section 702 of this statute allows the government to collect electronic
communications on U.S. soil, where the target of the communications is not
known to be a U.S. citizen and is believed to be located outside the United
States.164
Leaked documents suggest that the government has used this provision to
engage in programmatic collection, gaining insight into citizens’ private
relationships. 165 According to the Director of National Intelligence, only one
order has been issued under the section, naming 89,138 targets. 166 When
160. SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 16, at 201–202.
161. Id. at 205–206.
162. Id.; see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) (roving
wiretap provision).
163. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438; See also Donohue, International Content, supra
note 18.
164. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, §702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438. Under this provision, the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence may jointly authorize surveillance for up to one year. Id. at §
702(a). The statute prohibits the NSA from conducting reverse-targeting (i.e., targeting
someone outside the U.S. with the purpose of collecting the communications of a specific
person inside the U.S.). Id. at § 702(b)(2). It prohibits the collection of entirely domestic
communications. Id. at § 702(b)(4).
165. See, e.g., NSA, Exhibit B: Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security
Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence information Pursuant to
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (2009),
available at http://perma.cc/F226-ASQ3; James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole
Allows Warrantless Search for U.S. Citizens’ Emails and Phone Calls, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.
9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searchesemail-calls.
166. OFFICE OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT

2015]

The Dawn of Social Intelligence (SOCINT)

1085

communications have one person based overseas (known as “one end foreign” or
“1EF”), communications to or from the United States with that entity can be
collected. 167 The NSA interprets the law to mean that it may not just collect
information to or from the named targets, but any communications “about” the
targets.168 So, if two people who have no relationship to the target happen to
mention the target, or “selectors” associated with the target, then their
communications are identified and collected. In order to find out who is
mentioning the target, or selectors associated with the target, the NSA must
monitor all communications—with the result that Americans’ international
communications are subject to surveillance.
Two programs in the public domain are currently associated with Section
702. The first, PRISM, draws from Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook,
PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple—some of the largest
communications providers, making the type of information that can be obtained
substantial: email, video and voice chat, videos, photos, stored data, VoIP, file
transfers, video conferencing, social networking details, and the like.169
REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES: ANNUAL STATISTICS FOR CALENDAR
YEAR
2013
(2014),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/tp/National_
Security_Authorities_Transparency_Report_CY2013.pdf.
167. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, §702, 122 Stat. 2436; see also Donohue, International Content, supra note 18.
168. See NSA, Exhibit A: Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting
Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States to
Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended (2009), available at http://perma.cc/E2NG-PU9P
(“[I]n those cases where NSA seeks to acquire communications about the target that are not to
or from the target, NSA will either employ an Internet Protocol filter to ensure that the person
from whom it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located overseas, or it will
target Internet links that terminate in a foreign country.”); see also PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 38 (2014) [hereinafter
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 702 REPORT], available at
http://www.pclob.gov/
Library/702-Report-2.pdf; Donohue, International Content, supra note 18, at 159.
169. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-usinternet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html; Glen Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism program taps in
to user data of Apple, Google and others, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. The Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board later clarified, “Once foreign intelligence acquisition has been
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The second, “upstream” collection under Section 702, amounts to
collection from the servers of U.S. service providers. 170 It allows the NSA to
acquire Internet communications “as they transit the ‘internet backbone’
facilities.”171 It monitors all traffic crossing cables—not just information targeted
at specific Internet protocol addresses or telephone numbers. 172 By 2011, the
NSA was acquiring around 26.5 million Internet transactions per year through
upstream collection.173
While the full scope of social network collection outside of FISA is not
publicly known, documents leaked over the past two years show that massive
amounts of data are being obtained under Executive Order 12333. Under one
program (Mystic), the NSA collects metadata on all mobile communications to,
from, and within the Bahamas, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and elsewhere.174
In some cases, the NSA also collects the content of all telephone calls to, from,
and within entire countries. 175 A leaked NSA document notes that one such
program processes over 100 million calls per day.176
The data being collected includes email address books and contact lists,

authorized under Section 702, the government sends written directives to electronic
communication service providers compelling their assistance in the acquisition of
communications.” PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 702 REPORT, supra note
168, at 7.
170. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion (Redacted),
(FISA Ct. Sept. 2012) [hereinafter FISC Mem. Op. 2012], available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.pdf; Brett Max
Kaufman, A Guide to What We Now Know About the NSA’s Dragnet Searches of Your
Communications, ACLU (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/guide-what-we-nowknow-about-nsas-dragnet-searches-your-communications.
171. FISC Mem. Op. 2012, supra note 170170, at 26, https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.pdf.
172. See id. at 26–27.
173. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2011 WL
10945618, at *26 (FISA Ct. 2011).
174. Ryan Devereaux, Glenn Greenwald & Laura Poitras, Data Pirates of the Caribbean:
The NSA is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, THE INTERCEPT (May 19,
2014),
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recordingevery-cell-phone-call-bahamas/.
175. Id.; see also Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Surveillance Program Reaches
‘Into the Past’ to Retrieve, Replay Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reachesinto-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e76adc9210f19_story.html.
176. Devereaux, Greenwald & Poitras, supra note 174.174
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which can be analyzed to build robust social models. In conjunction with the
NSA’s UK counterpart, General Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), for
example, the government appears to be tapping Yahoo and Google’s internal
networks to harvest address books and instant messaging contact lists,
implicating hundreds of millions of customers.177
According to a leaked, internal NSA slide presentation, in a single day in
2012, NSA’s Special Source Operations branch collected nearly half a million
address books from Yahoo, more than 100,000 from Hotmail, approximately
82,000 from Facebook, another 33,000 from Gmail, and some 23,000 from other
providers. 178 Muscular, as the program is called, holds the information in a
temporary buffer, where it is scanned for certain information.179 Data considered
relevant is then sent back to the NSA.180 The volume is considerable: between
December 2012 and January 2013, more than 181 million new records were
obtained in this way.181
Webcam images and chat sessions are also appear to be collected under
Executive Order 12333. GCHQ files from 2008 to 2010 reference a program
called Optic Nerve, in which Yahoo webcam chats were collected in bulk,
regardless of whether the individual user was a foreign intelligence target. 182
During one six-month period, GCHQ, with the help of the NSA, collected visual
data from more than 1.8 million Yahoo user accounts around the world.183 The
system began as an experiment in automated facial recognition, with one image

177. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books
Globally, WASH. POST (Oct 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-booksglobally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.
178. Id.
179. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoogoogle-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e38b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images
Intercepted by GCHQ, THE GUARDIAN (Feb 28, 2014),
http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo.
183. Id. As a domestic matter, there are no restrictions on the NSA’s collection of
information on British subjects, just as there are no British restrictions on GCHQ’s collection
of information on American citizens. Id.
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every five minutes selected from users’ feeds.184 Access to all Yahoo webcam
images or events provided the agencies with insight into online users. 185 The
information was then fed into NSA’s XKeyscore search tool.186
Text messages similarly are not immune. In 2011, an internal slide
presentation at the NSA referred to SMS Text Messages “A Goldmine to
Exploit.”187 Under Executive Order 12333, the NSA has collected almost 200
million text messages per day, globally, using them to ascertain location, travel
plans, social networks, and credit card details. 188 Like the bulk collection of
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the SMS
message program, codenamed Dishfire, is not targeted.189
In addition to direct text messages, the program provides the government
with access to missed-call alerts, which can be used to conduct contact-chaining
analysis, to determine international movement (e.g., from network roaming
alerts), or to obtain electronic business cards, financial transactions, or
geolocation data from requests by people for route information or to set up
meetings.190
The NSA also collects geolocational information. Nearly 5 billion records
per day help the agency to find mobile phones around the world, and to map
relationships between mobile telephone users.191 By some accounts, the agency
has more than 27 terabytes of data associated with this program.192
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. Private, sexually explicit webcam material proved to be a particular challenge:

between 3 percent and 11 percent of the Yahoo webcam imagery obtained by GCHQ
contained “undesirable nudity.” Id.
187. See NSA Dishfire Presentation on Text Message Collection—Key Extracts, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2014/jan/16
/nsa-dishfire-text-messages-documents.
188. James Ball, NSA Collects Millions of Text Messages Daily in ‘Untargeted’ Global
Sweep, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep; see also
Dishfire Presentation, supra note 187.
189. Ball, supra note 188; see also Dishfire Presentation, supra note 187.
190. Ball, supra note 188.
191. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide,
Snowden
Documents
Show,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
4,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locationsworldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56c6ca94801fac_story.html.
192. Id.; see also FASCIA: The NSA’s Huge Trove of Location Records, WASH. POST,
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The NSA has constructed databases to house this social network
information. XKeyscore appears to have the widest-reaching collection of online
information.193 It includes Digital Network Intelligence—understood as “nearly
everything a typical user does on the internet,” such as email, social media, chats,
websites visited, and metadata. 194 The amount of information is staggering.
William Binney, a former mathematician at the NSA, said in 2012 that, looking
solely at phone calls and emails, the agency had “assembled on the order of 20
trillion transactions about U.S. citizens with other U.S. citizens.” 195 At some
sites, the amount of data obtained daily is so massive (more than 20 terabytes),
that it can only be stored for short periods.196
These programs signal the dawn of a new age of intelligence collection—
one centered on the acquisition and analysis of digitized information about social
relationships. Significant risks attend.
IV. THE DANGERS OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
Social network construction and analysis can reveal our most intimate
details. 197 Social intelligence derives, in part, from the type of information at
issue in the telephony metadata program. 198 In many ways, such data is more
devastating than pure content.
As Stewart Baker, NSA’s former general counsel, stated,, “Metadata
absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life.”199 Baker concluded, “If
you have enough metadata you don’t really need content . . . . [It’s] sort of
embarrassing how predictable we are as human beings.” 200 General Michael
Hayden concurred, stating Baker was “absolutely correct.” 201 Hayden added,

http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/what-is-fascia/637 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
193. Greenwald, XKeyscore, supra note 30.
194. Id.
195. Glenn Greenwald, Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible to the US
Government?, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston.
196. Greenwald, XKeyscore, supra note 30.
197. See Written Testimony of Edward W. Felten, United States Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary Hearing on Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 113th
Cong. 7–8 (2013) [hereinafter Written Testimony].
198. Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 62.
199. Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 21,
2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/nov/21/snowden-leaks-and-public/.
200. Id. (alteration in original).
201. David Cole, ‘We Kill People Based on Metadata,’ N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10,
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“We kill people based on metadata.”202
Even if citizens want to prevent their metadata from being collected, it
would be almost impossible to do so.203 Encryption is advancing; however, most
of its trajectory centers on protecting content—not metadata.204 The only realistic
option therefore is to refrain from using digital technology.205 Doing so, however,
would mean rejecting the contemporary world, with potentially devastating
consequences for one’s relationships, employment, and personal affairs.206
Metadata matters because it offers reliable information about a broad range
of behavior, offering insight into what we have done, as well as what we are
likely to do.207 Social media does the same, as does pattern analysis based on
movement. A tremendous amount of information can be conveyed, in the process
creating vulnerabilities.
A. What Analytics Can Demonstrate
Even seemingly innocuous data, like the telephony metadata at issue in the
Section 215 program, can carry with it deep implications for individual privacy.
A study conducted in 2015 by computer scientists at Stanford University
determined that “phone metadata is unambiguously sensitive,” even when
collected for three months on just over 500 people.208 The researchers were able
to attribute a range of medical conditions and beliefs to the participants in the

2014), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/may/10/we-kill-people-based-metadata/.
202. Id. For a discussion of the use of telephony metadata in signature strikes (predator
drone strikes based on SIGINT and patterns of behavior), see Dana Priest, NSA Growth
Fueled by Need to Target Terrorists, WASH. POST (July 21, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-growth-fueled-by-need-to-targetterrorists/2013/07/21/24c93cf4-f0b1-11e2-bed3-b9b6fe264871_story.html; Jeremy Scahill &
Glenn Greenwald, NSA’s Secret Role in the U.S. Assassination Program, THE INTERCEPT
(Feb. 9, 2014), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/.
203. Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 874; Decl. of Prof. Edward Felton
at ¶¶ 30–37, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No.
13-cv-03994),
available
at
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/clapper/2013
.08.26%20ACLU%20PI%20Brief%20-%20Declaration%20-%20Felten.pdf.
204. Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 874.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Decl. of Prof. Edward Felton, supra note 203, at 58; Klayman v. Obama,
957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, No. 14-5004, 2015 WL
5058403 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2015); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d
724, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
208. Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 62.
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study, based solely on telephony metadata.209 Calls to health services, financial
services, pharmacies, sexually transmitted disease clinics, divorce lawyers, strip
clubs, recruiting and job placement organizations, and religious organizations—
even alone—provide inferential information about a person.210
Patterns in the numbers dialed and received reveal even more. 211 One
person in the Stanford study talked to cardiologists, then telephoned a medical
laboratory, after which the subject received calls from a pharmacy, and later
telephoned a cardiac arrhythmia device home reporting hotline. 212 Another
person called a firearms store known for selling AR-15 semiautomatic rifles,
prior to calling a gun manufacturer’s customer service. 213 Another subject
contacted a home improvement store, a locksmith, a dealer for hydroponics, and
a head shop.214 A fourth person talked for a considerable amount of time to her
sister. 215 Forty-eight hours later, she telephoned Planned Parenthood. 216 Two
weeks afterwards, she called the clinic a few times, and a month later called one
last time.217
The metadata represented a small sample, over a short period, with a
limited number of calls. Nevertheless, it revealed participants’ heart conditions,
gun purchases, cannabis cultivation, and decision to have an abortion.218
The collection of Internet and telephony metadata allows the government to
engage in social network analysis, building a detailed picture of citizens’
connectedness to each other—of what types of issues matter to us—and of our
stature in the social fabric.219 The ability to do so relates to the rapid growth of
new technologies and scholarly fields. 220 Digital platforms have created the
potential for mass communication. 221 The Internet distributes worldwide
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Written Testimony, supra not207e 197, at 10–11.
See DAVID KNOKE & SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 2 (2d ed. 2008).
See, e.g., Nagehan Ilhan, Sule Gündüz-Ögüdücü, & A. Sima Etaner-Uyar,
Introduction to Social Networks: Analysis and Case Studies, in SOCIAL NETWORKS: ANALYSIS
AND CASE STUDIES 1, 2 (2014).
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communications at the speed of light. In light of these advances, publications
centered on social network analytics have exponentially accelerated.222 “[S]everal
hundred papers in physics, mathematics, computer science, biology, economics,
and sociology” 223 and numerous books, have put forward new theories and
algorithms contributing to the evolution of network science. 224 Powerful
advances in computing, such as the advent of the cloud industry, which gives
users access to supercomputers around the globe and the ability to process
information, mean that massive datasets can now be built and mined to generate
new knowledge.225 More details about social behavior can be learned.226
These technologies are so strong that they may produce information that
individuals do not even know about themselves. They may not know how
important they are in the formal and informal groups of which they are a part.
But this can now be measured. A variable called “centrality” can be calculated to
ascertain their relative worth and to provide insight into how influential they may
be.227 There are different ways in which centrality can be measured.228 How short
the paths are between people, how many links they have to others, and how close
they are to other potentially powerful people in the network provide insight into
how much power they wield—and how they may exercise it. 229 Structural
cohesion generates insight.230
People may not realize their own habits, or the seriousness with which they
view certain issues, but both may become clear by the frequency with which they
act on their interests and beliefs. They may not know how dependent they are on
certain relationships. They may not be aware of the degree of power that others
222. Id.
223. Duncan J. Watts, The “New” Science of Networks, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 243, 243–44

(2004).
224. JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 1–2 (3d ed. 2013); For a discussion on
social network analysis and related areas, see Ilhan, Günduz-Ögüdücü, & Etaner-Uyar, supra
note 221, at 1–2; N. Gizen Kocak, Social Networks and Social Network Analysis, 5 INT’L J.
BUS. & SOC. SCI. 126, 126 (2014); Réka Albert and Albert-László Barabási, Statistical
Mechanics of Complex Networks, 74 REVIEWS OF MODERN PHYSICS 47, (2002) (reviewing
recent advances in the field of complex networks).
225. See, e.g., Ilhan, Günduz-Ögüdücü, & Etaner-Uyar, supra note 221, at 14–16;
Ruxandra-Ştefania Petre, Data Mining in Cloud Computing, 3 DATABASE SYSTEMS J. 67, 67–
68 (2012), available at http://www.dbjournal.ro/archive/9/9_7.pdf.
226. Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 62.
227. Ilhan, Günduz-Ögüdücü, & Etaner-Uyar, supra note 221, at 4.
228. See id. at 5–7.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 6.
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have over them, or that they have over others. They may not have insight into
connections between those with whom they are linked and others, or how closely
others, with whom they are connected, are tied into groups whose interests they
oppose or do not share.231 They may be unaware that some of those who are in
their group of associates are only in contact with them for instrumental reasons,
using the relationship to secure goods, services, or information for purposes that
are masked from their view. They may not be able to see others, virtual strangers
to them, who have a significant amount of power over their activities and their
ability to pursue their interests, simply because of these strangers’ centrality in
networks of which all are a part.232
Social network analytics allow people to find patterns in relations that
evolve over time. 233 Analysis may focus on individuals, small groups,
organizations, or even entire countries. 234 When all Internet or telephony
metadata is collected, the unit under consideration could be any number, or
configuration of individuals.235
The basic idea is that the regular patterns of relations between different
points provide a macrosocial context—or overall structure—which, in turn,
influences individuals’ precepts, beliefs, decisions, and actions.236 As one scholar
explains: “The central objectives of network analysis are to measure and
represent these structural relations accurately, and to explain both why they occur
and . . . their consequences.”237 Structure matters more than an individual’s age,
gender, or ideology.238 It reveals how powerful individuals may be in ways that
may not otherwise be obvious.239 A woman holding a menial job that does not
require a significant amount of initiative may be a strong member of the
neighborhood organization or the parent-teacher association. 240 Social network
analysis provides insight into how social status and strength—even of the same

231. The academic literature refers to this as “boundary penetration relations,” where
individuals may be members of two or more social formations. See KNOKE & YANG, supra
note 220, at 12.
232. See, e.g., KNOKE & YANG, supra note 220, at 4.
233. Id. at 2.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 5.
240. Id.
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person—may vary across contexts.241
Social network analytics carry with them a tremendous amount of power.242
If one political party accesses the telephone records of the opposing party, it can
identify the most powerful actors and then find a way either to alter their
behavior or to separate them from the network.243 Doing so could disrupt political
opposition. It could be done in quite visible ways, such as finding evidence of
illegal behavior and initiating prosecution against the target—or in less visible
ways, such as pressuring the surrounding network to get the target to act in a
certain way.
B. What Analytics Can Do
One of the insights discovered by social science is that relationships with
others influence perceptions, beliefs, and actions.244 The stronger the connection
with others, or the more intense the interaction with them, the more susceptible
people are to their influence. 245 As a result, identifying high intensity
relationships offers a lever to change others’ behavior.246
Behavior modification can be done not just for one person, but for a series
of individuals with a high level of centrality in social networks. Those who
control such corridors, or pathways, can put themselves in a position of social (or
political) control. 247 The scholarly literature is full of examples of how
controlling structural relations generates competitive, or cooperative, behavior—
whether it is in political movements, drug trafficking networks, terrorist
campaigns, or even regular corporate environments.248

241. Id. at 9.
242. Id. at 116.
243. See, e.g., Steve Ressler, Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat

Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future Research, HOMELAND SEC. AFF. 1, 2 (July 2006),
available at https://www.hsaj.org/articles/171.
244. KNOKE & YANG, supra note 220, at 4; see also Duncan, J. Watts, supra note 223, at
256.
245. See Florence Passy, Social Networks Matter, But How?, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
NETWORKS: RELATIONAL APPROACHES TO COLLECTIVE ACTION 21, 33 (Mario Diani & Doug
McAdam eds., 2003).
246. See Ramkrishnan V. Tenkasi & Marshal C. Chesmore, Social Networks and Planned
Organizational Change: The Impact of Strong Ties on Effective Change Implementation and
Use, 39 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 281, 283 (2003).
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 137 (2004) (Al
Qaeda and the Salafi jihad); Phil Williams, Transnational Criminal Networks, in NETWORKS
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The power of social networks to affect political change has already been
demonstrated in the Philippines, Spain, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere. 249
Concerted development or study of social networks as a prelude to action opens a
new door of vulnerability. The government can use social networks to force
political, economic, and social change. The U.S. has already conducted
programs, based on SOCINT, to try to build and then to influence the powerful
nodes in social networks.250 The aim of the enterprise was to counter political
opposition to the United States.251
In 2010 the U.S. government created a “Twitter” to generate a social
network in Cuba that could then be manipulated to undermine the government.252
The Associated Press, which reported on the project, reviewed more than 1,000
pages of documentation and conducted multiple interviews with people
involved.253 It found that it was not the CIA behind the initiative, but USAID, a
development agency—not even a formal part of the intelligence community
structure.254
The program was called ZunZuneo, which is slang in Cuban for the noise
made by a hummingbird. 255 It began by “tweeting” soccer results, music, and
weather reports—all rather benign.256 Once ZunZuneo reached a critical mass of
Cuban subscribers, though, the plan was to begin inserting content that would
create “smart mobs,” which could be mobilized at will, to trigger a “Cuban

AND NETWARS

61, 61 (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, eds., 2001) (criminal organizations);
Richard M. Medina, Social Network Analysis: A Case Study of the Islamist Terrorist Network,
27 SECURITY J. 97, 97–99 (2014) (Islamist terrorism); Passy, supra note 245, at 33
(social/political movements); Jörg Raab & H. Brinton Milward, Dark Networks as Problems,
13(4) J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413, 420–28 (2003) (drug-trafficking, the Al Qaeda
network, diamond and weapons trade); Ressler, supra note 243, at 2 (terrorist networks);
Tenksai & Chesmore, supra note 246, at 290 (multinational corporations).
249. See supra Part II.
250. Associated Press, U.S. Secretly Created “Cuban Twitter” to Stir Unrest and
Undermine Government, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2014) [hereinafter AP, Cuban Twitter],
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/03/us-cuban-twitter-zunzuneo-stir
-unrest.
251. See id. (describing that the goal of the program was to “undermin[e] Cuba’s
communist government” and that the program was ran by an office whose goal was to
promote U.S. interests).
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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spring.”257 The purpose of the program was to “renegotiate the balance of power
between the state and society.”258
USAID went to great lengths to mask the role of the U.S. government—
including from Congress itself. 259 The legislature had become increasingly
concerned about the agency’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which it stood up
just after the fall of the Soviet Union to promote U.S. interests abroad.260 Staff
Members of the Senate Foreign Relations recount how they could not even find
out in broad terms what USAID was doing.261 Senator Patrick Leahy, Chair of
the Appropriations Committee’s State Department and Foreign Operations
subcommittee did not know about the program—even though his subcommittee
ostensibly had oversight of it.262
USAID similarly tried to infiltrate the underground hip-hop scene in Cuba,
to spark a youth movement to overthrow President Raul Castro. 263 These
initiatives were done secretly, without Congressional oversight—and billed not
as covert action, but as an attempt to build civil society in Cuba.264 The purpose
was to gain social and political control.265
The collection of SOCINT offers the government a rich opportunity to
leverage the information because social networks are not static. 266 They are
continually evolving.267 Therefore, they can be used to manipulate and to alter
individual and organizational behavior. 268 They offer insight into specific

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; see also Associated Press, Senate Committee Probes “Cuban Twitter”
USAid ZunZuneo Programme, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2014) [hereinafter AP, ZunZuneo],
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/senate-committee-cuban-twitter-usaidzunzuneo.
263. Matthew Weaver & Associated Press, US Agency Infiltrated Cuban Hip-hop Scene
to
Spark
Youth
Unrest,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
10,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/cuban-hip-hop-scene-infiltrated-usinformation-youth.
264. See AP, ZunZuneo, supra note 262.
265. See id.
266. See Ressler, supra note 243, at 1–3.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Patrick Kenis & David Knoke, How Organizational Field Networks Shape
Interorganizational Tie-Formation Rates, ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 275, 277 (2002).
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attributes—such as what individuals like, or do not like, to do—as well as
relations between people and groups, and characteristics of the type of
connectedness in question.269 What is the nature of the relationship between two
people? Trust? Advice? Support? Or betrayal? Social network analytics provide a
context for relationships.270
Since 9/11, much attention has been paid to how to use network analysis to
respond to threats to U.S. national security. 271 One conclusion that researches
have reached is that it is difficult to obtain information about highly secretive,
global organizations that make it a point not to post data on otherwise publicly
available sites.272 But networks of all kinds have to communicate—after all, that
is what makes them a network—and global communication systems analytics
offer one way forward. Thus, we find ourselves in an age of social intelligence.
There are numerous difficulties with this approach. First, in some ways, it
has not been particularly effective.273 While the government initially claimed that
the telephony metadata program was a critical part of discovering and thwarting
dozens of planned attacks, after Congressional scrutiny, only one instance could
be produced where the government had used the Section 215 program to identify

269. See Ilhan, Günduz-Ögüdücü, & Etaner-Uyar, supra note 221, at 1.
270. See id.
271. See Ressler, supra note 243, at 3 (“After the attacks of 9/11, academia, the

government, and even mainstream media began to discuss the importance of social network
analysis in fighting terrorism.”).
272. Valdis E. Krebs, Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells, 24(3) CONNECTIONS 43, 44,
56 (2002), available at http://insna.org/PDF/Connections/v24/2001_I-3-7.pdf; Malcolm K.
Sparrow, The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the
Prospects, 13 SOC. NETWORKS 251, 262 (1991) (discussing the incompleteness of criminal
network data); see also Kathleen Carley, Estimating Vulnerabilities in Large Covert
Networks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2004 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMMAND AND
CONTROL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 2 (Carnegie-Melon Univ. June, 2004); Matthew
Dombroski, Paul Fischbeck & Kathleen M. Carley, Estimating the Shape of Covert Networks,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL RESEARCH AND
TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM 2 (National Defense War College, Washington, DC, 2003);
Maksim Tsvetovat & Kathleen Carley, On Effectiveness of Wiretap Programs in Mapping
Social
Networks
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cs.rit.edu/~amt/linkanalysis06/accepted/23.pdf. But see Center for Computational
Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems, Networks and Terrorism CASOS Projects,
CASOS, http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/terrorism/projects.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (using
complex modeling to analyze covert networks by relying on predictive modeling of network
structure).
273. See, e.g., Peter Bergen, NSA and Your Phone Records: What Should Obama Do?,
CNN (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/15/opinion/bergen-nsa-obama-phone/.
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a terrorist.274 Basaaly Moalin, a cab driver in San Diego, donated money to alShabab in Somalia. 275 Even this example was weak: for two months after
discovering Moalin’s complicity in terrorist actions overseas, the FBI declined to
take any further action.276
Scholars and experts have looked into the question and concluded that, as a
means of uncovering terrorist plots, communications metadata, in particular, is
full of weaknesses.277 In 2008, the National Research Council of the Academies
of Science released the results of an intensive study conducted by prominent
academics in computer science, data mining, behavioral science, terrorism, and
law.278 “Modern data collection and analysis techniques,” the final report stated,
“have had remarkable success in solving information-related problems in the
commercial sector. . . . But such highly automated tools and techniques cannot be
easily applied to the much more difficult problem of detecting and preempting a
274. Mattathias Schwartz, The Whole Haystack: The N.S.A. Claims it Needs Access to All
Our Phone Records. But is That the Best Way to Catch a Terrorist?, THE NEW YORKER,
(January 26, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack (“[A]s
evidence of the fifty-four disrupted plots came apart, many people in Washington shifted their
rhetoric on Section 215 away from specific cases and toward hypotheticals and analogies.”).
Initial claims by the Government conflated Section 702 and Section 215 data and were later
found to be overblown. For example, General Keith Alexander stated before Congress that
“the information gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical
leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the
world.” Bergen, supra note 273 (quotation marks omitted). Representative Mike Rogers, chair
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, claimed in July 2014 that “54
times the NSA programs ‘stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe—
saving real lives.” Id. Senator Patrick Leahy subsequently attacked these numbers, noting that
they conflated the content collection programs with the metadata collection programs.
Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance
Programs: Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. 1–3 (2013) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman) available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/fisaoversight.pdf.
275. Ellen Nakashima, NSA Cites Case as Success of Phone Data-Collection Program,
WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsacites-case-as-success-of-phone-data-collection-program/2013/08/08/
fc915e5a-feda-11e2-96a8-d3b921c0924a_story.html (“Across a dozen years of records
collection, critics say, the government has offered few instances in which the massive
storehouse of Americans’ records contained the first crucial lead that cracked a case — and
even those, they say, could have been obtained through a less intrusive method.”); see also
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 702 REPORT, supra note 168.
276. Nakashima, supra note 275.
277. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT 2–3 (2008).
278. Id. at 1–2.
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terrorist attack, and success in doing so may not be possible at all.” 279 The
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), after looking carefully at
the NSA’s telephony metadata program, similarly determined that it “has not
proven useful in identifying unknown terrorists or terrorist plots.” 280 To the
contrary, information obtained through querying the metadata merely confirmed
relationships that had already been determined through other means.281 Weighed
against the government’s potential use of the information for myriad purposes,
the PCLOB called for an end to the program.282
The lack of effectiveness of bulk collection of metadata has been echoed by
a number of studies. The New America Foundation, for instance, analyzed 225
individuals recruited by al Qaeda and similar organizations and subsequently
charged with terrorism.283 “Traditional investigative methods, such as the use of
informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence operations,
provided the initial [identification of the individuals],” even as the bulk collection
program provided minimal help.284 “Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of
American telephone metadata,” the Foundation explained, “appears to have
played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases.”285
One possible reason that metadata may not be effective for
counterterrorism stems from the “snowballing” method adopted by the
government. 286 Agents identify a particular telephone number, find associated
numbers, and then determine the numbers to which those numbers are linked.
The problem is that this approach is biased towards highly connected
networks. 287 Terrorist organizations, however, commonly work along a cell
structure, in which there are relatively weak connections between actors.288 It is
not the most connected that are likely to engage in terrorist activity, but those on
the periphery that are more likely to be involved in violence.289 A similar claim

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 2.
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 215 REPORT supra note 128, at 158.
Id.
Id.
Bailey Cahall et al., Do NSA’s Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?, NEW
AMERICA (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsas-bulksurveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See Tsvetovat & Carley, supra note 272, at 1–2.
287. Id. at 15–16.
288. Id. at 2.
289. Id.
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has been made about Islamist networks—that they are sparsely populated and
structured along a cell system.290
A second, important consideration is that every person in the United States
relies on communications networks to go about their daily lives. It would be
difficult to live in the contemporary world without a telephone or access to the
Internet. And so, it is not just potential terrorists’ metadata that is collected (and
for which such a method is significantly flawed), but all Americans’ data.
Citizens find their most intimate lives exposed to the government. 291 Unlike
Islamist organizations, which often have sparse communication networks and,
because of their structure, are not as vulnerable to social network analytics,
ordinary citizens’ social networks may be extremely dense, generating much
more—and more intimate—information. 292 The cost is borne by individual
liberty and inroads into privacy.
V. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
While the technological capabilities of social network mapping are
revolutionary, the concerns that accompany the growth of the field are far from
new. The Founders introduced the Fourth Amendment to protect against the
danger that the government could cast about for information, which it could then
use to bring criminal charges.293 The Founders were deeply concerned about the
potential harms caused by allowing the government access to citizens’ private
lives. Doing so threatened solitude, intimate relations, and even democratic
deliberation. It was too much power to put into one place. In taking the position
that they did, the Founders drew heavily from their English legacy.294
A. Prohibition on General Warrants
A general warrant is a document, issued by a court or by the executive
branch, giving officials the broad authority to search for and to seize private
290.
291.
292.
293.

See Medina, supra note 248, at 101.
See Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 759–60
See id. at 871–72.
See generally Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment] (discussing, in
detail, the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment and its rejection of General Warrants);
see also William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372
(1980).
294. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293, (manuscript at 28);
Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 293, at 372.
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documents, without any prior, specific evidence of wrongdoing.295 It does not
specify, with particularity, the person or place to be searched, or the papers or
records to be seized. 296 It is not supported by oath or affirmation of any
wrongdoing.297
For hundreds of years prior to the founding, English jurists considered
general warrants to be a violation of the British Constitution.298 Thus it was that
Sir Edward Coke insisted in Parliament that the Petition of Right include a clause
prohibiting promiscuous search and seizure.299 It was against the Reason of the
Common Law (and thus “unreasonable”) to allow for such instruments. No royal
prerogative, or reason of state, could justify such tyrannical instruments:
[I]f [imprisonment] be per mandatum domini regis, or ‘for matter of
state’; and then we are gone, and we are in a worse case than ever. If we
agree to this imprisonment ‘for matters of state’ and ‘a convenient time,’ we
shall leave Magna Carta and the other statutes and make them fruitless, and
do what our ancestors would never do.300

Coke returned to these arguments in his Institutes of the Laws of England, writing
that to issue a general warrant is against Magna Carta.301
In 1678, Sir Matthew Hale similarly condemned general warrants in the
first volume of his Pleas of the Crown: or, A Methodical Summary of the
Principal Matters Relating to that Subject. 302 Later, in Historia Placitorum
Coronæ (History of the Pleas of the Crown), Hale wrote, “[A] general warrant to

295. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293; Cuddihy & Hardy,
supra note 293, at 372; see also William C. Banks, A Look at the Global Response to
Terrorism: The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1209–11 (2007).
296. See Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293.
297. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 550–51 (1999).
298. Id.
299. Coke to Parliament, Committee of the Whole House, Proceedings and Debates, ff.
100–100v, in CD, III, 149–51 (Apr. 29, 1628) reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR
EDWARD COKE, at 1270–71.
300. Coke to Parliament, Committee of the Whole House, Proceedings and Debates, f.
99, in CD, III, 94–96(Apr. 26, 1628), in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 299, at 1268.
301. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 35
(1644) (“Nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittimus, nisi per legale judicium parium
suorum, vel per legem Terrae [Neither will we pass upon him, or condemn him, but by the
lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land].”).
302. See SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, A METHODICAL SUMMARY OF THE
PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT 93 (1678) (citing C. Jur. Courts, p. 177).
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search in all suspected places is not good, but only to search in such particular
places, where the party assigns before the justice his suspicion and the probable
cause thereof, for these warrants are judicial acts, and must be granted upon
examination of the fact.”303
It was to Hale’s writing that Lord Chief Justice Mansfield famously
appealed in the case of Money v. Leach. 304 In other cases, such as Entick v.
Carrington and Wilkes v. Wood, the English law lords repeatedly rejected general
warrants. 305 Similarly, it was to Coke and Hale that Serjeant-at-Law William
Hawkins appealed in his Pleas of the Crown to state the illegality of general
warrants: “I do not find any good Authority, That a Justice can justify sending a
general Warrant to search all suspected Houses in general for stolen Goods.”306
Probable cause must first be demonstrated (under oath), particularity attached,
and a specific warrant issued.307 A number of influential English legal treatises
and abridgements followed Hawkins’s Pleas, condemning general warrants.308
By the time of the founding, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Laws of England announced that the question had been well settled:
Sir Edward Coke indeed has laid it down that a justice of the peace cannot
issue a warrant to apprehend a felon upon bare suspicion; no, not even till an
indictment be actually found: and the contrary practice is by others held to
be grounded rather upon connivance than the express rule of law; though
now by long custom established.309

For Blackstone, “A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected, without
naming or particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and void for its
uncertainty; for it is the duty of the magistrate, and ought not to be left to the
officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion.”310
The rejection of general warrants traversed the Atlantic. When the Crown
tried to make greater use of promiscuous search and seizure to crack down on

303. 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ 150 (1736).
304. Money v. Leach, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.) 1083, 1088.
305. Entick v. Carrington, (1976) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.) 1072–73; Wilkes v. Wood,

(1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.) 490.
306. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 84 (1716–1721).
307. Id. at 82, 84.
308. See, e.g., 4 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND THE PARISH OFFICER
105–07 (12th ed. 1772).
309. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *290 (1769).
310. Id. at 291 (citing HALE, supra note 302, at 580; HAWKINS, supra note 306, at 82).
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smuggling, colonists rejected the practice as contrary to their rights as
Englishmen.311
James Otis’s speech challenging the Crown’s use of general warrants is one
of the most famous orations in U.S. history. 312 More than five decades
afterwards, John Adams, who had been present at the time, related, “Otis was a
flame of fire!”313 His performance had “breathed into this nation the breath of
life.”314 Adams declared, “Then and there was the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born.”315
Otis attacked the idea that the government could simply collect information
to try to find evidence of wrongdoing: “I will to my dying day oppose with all the
powers and faculties God has given me, all such instruments of slavery on the
one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of assistance is.”316 The writ of
assistance was “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an
English law-book.”317
The writs created the potential for misuse of the power for personal
purposes. 318 Otis lamented, “Every man, prompted by revenge, ill humor, or
wantonness, to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s house, may get a writ of
assistance. Others will ask it from self-defence; one arbitrary exertion will
provoke another, until society be involved in tumult and blood.”319 Otis echoed
Coke: the Reason of the Common Law demanded that the Court find such
instruments illegal.320

311. See, e.g., Circular from William Pitt to Francis Bernard (Aug. 23, 1760), in THE
PAPERS OF FRANCIS BERNARD: GOVERNOR OF COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1769, at 52–
53 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2007) [hereinafter Circular from William Pitt]; JOSIAH QUINCY, JR.,
REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 407–08 (Samuel M. Quincy
ed., 1865); see also Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293.
312. See id.
313. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
314. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
315. Id. at 248.
316. 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 523 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1865).
317. Id.
318. See id. at 524–25.
319. Id.
320. See id.
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The colonists’ rejection of general warrants did not end with the founding.
In Virginia, Patrick Henry, George Washington, Edmund Pendleton, George
Mason, George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, and Thomas Jefferson, among
others, adopted a provision in the Virginia Declaration of Rights condemning
general warrants.321 In Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin, George Bryan, James
Cannon, Thomas Paine, and others did the same.322 The newly formed states of
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New
Hampshire all banned general warrants.323
Early Americans repeatedly articulated the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure as the grounds on which general warrants would
not be allowed. 324 As Adams wrote in the Massachusetts document, “Every
subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”325
“Unreasonable” here had a particular meaning: namely, against reason or
opposed to common law.326 General warrants violated the common law.327 The
Massachusetts Constitution continued,
All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or
foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and
if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property,
be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of
search, arrest, or seizure . . . .328

By using “therefore” in this way, Adams underscored that it was to ensure the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, that general warrants, and special
warrants lacking an oath, evidence, and particularity with regard to the persons to

321. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 10; Delegates to the Constitutional Convention: Virginia,
UM-KC, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/marryvirginia.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2015).
322. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1776); Delegates to the Constitutional Convention:
Pennsylvania,
UM-KC,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/marrypenn.
html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
323. See DEL. CONST. art. I, § 17; MD. CONST. art. I, § 23; N.H. CONST. of 1784 Pt. I, art.
XIX; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. art. I, § 11.
324. See, e.g., supra note 275 & accompanying text.
325. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XIV.
326. See Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293.
327. See id.
328. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XIV (emphasis added).
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be arrested or places to be searched, would not be allowed. 329 The state
constitution added, “[A]nd no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.”330 Only warrants that comported with the
requisite particularity, supported by oath, would be valid. 331 These state
declarations transformed the colonists’ objection to general warrants into a
positive right.332
In 1787, the new constitution transformed federal power.333 The ratification
debates immediately seized on whether a prohibition on general warrants would
be required to protect individual rights.334 In Virginia, Patrick Henry demanded
that a bill of rights be adopted to preserve the rights and privileges of the
people.335 He worried that government officials could go into citizens “cellars
and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure every thing you eat, drink, and
wear.”336 “I feel myself distressed,” he admitted,
because the necessity of securing our personal rights seems not to have
pervaded the minds of men; for many other valuable things are omitted. For
instance, general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places,
without evidence of the commission of a fact . . . .337

Property could be taken “in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or
reason.”338 Everything considered sacred could “be searched and ransacked by
the strong hand of power.”339 Delegates agreed.340 Virginia proposed that a bill of
rights, which included a prohibition on general warrants, be adopted.341
In New York, a “Son of Liberty” predicted that general warrants would be

329.
330.
331.
332.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See, e.g., supra note 325 & accompanying text; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art.

XIV.
333. See Constitution of the United States—A History, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
334. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS: ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 468, 658 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901).
335. Id. at 593–94.
336. Id. at 414.
337. Id. at 532.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 657.
341. Id.
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one of the curses that would “be entailed on the people of America, by this
preposterous and newfangled system, if they are ever so infatuated as to receive
it.”342 According to the writer, “Men of all ranks and conditions, subject to have
their houses searched by officers, acting under the sanction of general warrants,
their private papers seized, and themselves dragged to prison, under various
pretences, whenever the fear of their lordly masters shall suggest, that they are
plotting mischief against their arbitrary conduct.”343
The New York convention went so far as to insist that it was only with the
understanding that Congress would amend the Constitution to take account of the
right against general search, and others laid out in its ratification document, that
it consented to the new Constitution. 344 The convention attached a military
reservation to make it clear that it did not make its representation lightly.345
Rhode Island, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania followed suit.346
In the last, Samuel Bryan, an Anti-Federalist writing as “Centinel,” repeatedly
raised a similar concern.347 He wrote, “Your present frame of government secures
you to a right to hold yourselves, houses, papers and possessions free from search
and seizure.”348 Bryan explained, “therefore warrants granted without oaths or
affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them . . . shall not be
granted.” 349 The right against promiscuous search and seizure hung in the
balance: “whether your papers, your persons, and your property, are to be held
sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine.”350 Madison
incorporated these concerns into what is now the Fourth Amendment.351
342. A Son of Liberty, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 1 VOLUME XIX,
RATIFICATION BY THE STATE: NEW YORK 134, 134 (2009), available at
http://csac.history.wisc.edu/son_of_liberty.pdf.
343. Id. (emphasis in original).
344. See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS: ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 329, 329 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
345. Id. (“In full confidence, nevertheless, that, until a convention shall be called and
convened for proposing amendment to the said Constitution, the militia of this state will not
be continued in service out of this state for a longer term than six weeks, without the consent
of the legislature thereof.”).
346. See id. at 319–20, 323–25, 335.
347. To
Thomas Jefferson from Samuel Brian, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-33-02-0069 (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
348. Centinel, No. 1, (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 349 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015).
349. Id.
350. Id. (emphasis in original).
351. See Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten
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The collection of SOCINT raises constitutional concerns in the extent to
which it results in private information being collected by the government without
evidence of prior wrongdoing. 352 Nor do the SOCINT programs underway
specify the individual about whom information is to be obtained; instead,
information is generally collected about everyone, with the hope of uncovering
illegal activity. That this information is now being queried using U.S. person
information, for criminal matters unrelated to foreign intelligence collection,
further underscores the deep constitutional questions at stake.
It was precisely to prevent the government from collecting massive
amounts of information that the Founders adopted the Fourth Amendment. 353
They were concerned about the potential use of such information for political
purposes—to head off opposition to the government, or to the government’s
political, social, or economic agenda.354 One of the dangers they perceived was
precisely that at issue in the ZunZuneo case: that the information could be used
for political purposes.355
New and emerging technologies magnify the Founders’ concerns. Not only
could the collection of private information cause great mischief, but the
digitization of so much information has also deepened privacy interests.356 It is
not just the details about an individual with whom one is in correspondence, but
the details of everyone with whom citizens communicate, their degree of power
in different networks, and the strength of their relationships with other people
and entities.357
In the post-Snowden era, one example of SOCINT that has gained
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due
Process Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 138–39 (2007).
352. See generally Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293
(discussing the history of general warrants); see also Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra
note 16, at 863–65 (2014); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 37 (D.D.C. 2013)
(declining to answer the question of whether the collection of metadata violated the Fourth
Amendment, but noting it is “significantly likely” such collection does violate the protections
of the Constitution), vacated and remanded, No. 14-5004, 2015 WL 5058403, at *9 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 28, 2015).
353. See Rand Paul & Chris Coons, The Founding Fathers Would Have Protected Your
Smartphone, POLITICO (May 27, 2014), www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/a-techchallenge-for-fourth-amendment-application-107129.
354. See id.
355. See AP, Cuban Twitter, supra note 250.
356. See Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 62 (discussing sensitive and even criminal
inferences that can be from metadata).
357. See id; see also Ilhan, Günduz-Ögüdücü, & Etaner-Uyar, supra note 221, at 1–3.
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prominence among scholars revolves around Paul Revere.358 What, exactly, was
his role in the Revolution? It turns out that he was more than just a messenger.359
Using the membership rosters of Whig groups, social network scholars have
demonstrated that Revere was a key link between revolutionary entities, spanning
different social strata and connecting disparate organizations. 360 As such, he
played a central role in forging the movement.361 As Shin-Kap Han, a Professor
of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, pointed out, the
key question was not who Revere was, but how and why he mattered to the
underlying structure and, in turn, to the outcome of the movement. 362 When
mapped, Revere’s centrality to the Revolution becomes clear.
In 1776, the British Government did not have access to the types of digital
information and algorithmic analytics that today mark the field.363 Whether an
individual was involved in the St. Andrews Lodge, the Loyal Nine, the North
Caucus, the Long Room Club, the Tea Party, or the Boston Committee, might
have been available on a limited bases because of HUMINT. 364 The social
network analytics that would have given this information deeper meaning,
though, had yet to be constructed.365
Some commentators have pointed to the Revere data as evidence for why
SOCINT ought to be collected.366 The Revolutionists, after all, were engaged in a
violent upheaval against the government.367 Others see the potential as precisely
the type of government overreach that justified the Revolution in the first

358. Shin-Kap Han, The Other Ride of Paul Revere: the Brokerage Role in the Making of
the American Revolution, 14 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L Q. 143, 143–62 (2009), available at
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/chwe/ps269/han.pdf;
Kieran
Healy,
Using
Metadata
to
Find
Paul
Revere
(Jun.
9,
2013),
http://kieranhealy.org/
blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/.
359. Han, supra note 358, at 143.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See Healy, supra note 358.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, What if the ‘Redcoat NSA’ Had Access to Paul Revere’s
Metadata?
BLOOMBERG
(June
12,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2013-06-12/what-if-the-redcoat-nsa-had-access-to-paul-reveres-metadata.
367. Sean Hollister, Paul Revere Could Have Been Caught if the British Crown Collected
Metadata,
THE
VERGE
(Jan.
17,
2014),
http://www.theverge.com/2014
/1/17/5319534/paul-revere.
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place.368
Whatever one’s take on the data might be, at a minimum, it is clear that
SOCINT offers an incredibly powerful tool—one that is qualitatively different
from other forms of intelligence, and one that carries with it the potential for
devastating harm. Equally important are the rights implications underlying the
collection of such information in the first place.
B. Protection of Individual Rights
Not all information that contributes to SOCINT derives from
communications metadata. Other information, such as that gleaned from social
network sites, may be substantive.369 Telephony metadata, however, provides a
good case study because some see it as an outlier—as not implicating the same
privacy interests as content.370
This argument is backed by Supreme Court doctrine dating back to the
1970s, when landlines dominated communications.371 In Smith v. Maryland, the
Court ruled that telephony data provided to third parties does not enjoy Fourth
Amendment protections.372
The problems with this argument are manifold. Most concerning, it fails to
acknowledge that the entire point of collecting social intelligence is to map
relationships and levels of intimacy between individuals. The Founders, rightly,
evinced concern about giving the government insight into citizens’ private
lives.373
Part of the reason for their aversion relates to the harms detailed above.374
That is, the information could be used to blackmail individuals opposed to the
rulers’ social, political, or economic policies. 375 Information could be used to
discredit others—or criminal charges for unrelated offenses could be introduced
to prevent opposition.376 The advent of SOCINT creates precisely the opportunity
for such mischief. It was not the Founders’ sole concern.

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

See id.
See PATTON, supra note 15, at 12.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
See id.
Id.; Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 863–71.
See Paul & Coons, supra note 353.
Id.
Id.
See Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 62; AP, Cuban Twitter, supra note 250.
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Early Americans also worried about rights themselves.377 The walls of the
home stood as a proxy for the right to privacy, the protection of which provided
multiple benefits for self and society.378 The right to guard against unwelcome
intrusion meant that a safe haven could be created, within which individuals
could retreat from the outside world. 379 Solitude, and the need to protect
individuals against intrusion from others, becomes ever more important in the
digital age. It is important because it allows individuals to develop autonomy and
ideas.
By tracking social relationships, the government risks incursions into this
private sphere. If individuals think they are being watched, their behavior
changes.380 This impacts our ability to develop our ideas, and it hurts intimacy
between individuals.381 Diversity in one’s relationships, however, is an essential
part of human development. It also matters for the strength of the social fabric.382
If people fear the government tracking them because they are in conversations
with individuals from an ethnic or religious group considered suspect, then the
ties between individuals in that group and those outside that group may
significantly weaken. 383 So, too, may relationships among group members
dissipate. What results is a much weaker social fabric with long-term
consequences for humanistic interests of each person, much less the social ties
themselves. It is not just the right to privacy that is hurt by SOCINT, but also
associated rights such as the right to free association and the right to free speech.
One may not communicate with others because of fear of government intrusion,
thus harming one’s ability to articulate different beliefs, thoughts, and ideas.
There is yet another aspect of the right itself that affects the nature of the
state, and that is democratic deliberation.384 SOCINT makes it exceedingly easy
to monitor political communities, which, as a result, may well alter their level of

377. See Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293, (manuscript at 40–
41); Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 293, at 391–400.
378. See Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293 (manuscript at 36);
Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 293, at 400.
379. See Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293 (manuscript at 36);
Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 293, at 371–72.
380. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association; Political Profiling,
Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. Rev. 621, 646 (2004).
381. See id. at 646–50.
382. See id.
383. See id.
384. See Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293 (manuscript at 11–
13).
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engagement with political or economic concerns. Surveillance therefore may
harm society’s ability to develop more robust policies, as well as stifle public
debate about the strengths and weaknesses of the current regime.
A final consideration relates to structure itself. The intelligence agencies
represent just one portion of one branch of the federal government.385 This type
of power, amassed in the hands of the few and ripe for abuse, has long term
consequences for the distribution of power both among the federal branches of
government as well as between the federal and state entities.386
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Rapid technological and algorithmic advances have given rise to a new
form of information: social intelligence. This tool, which centers on the
collection of non-traditional forms of data about relationships, such as those
offered by social media, communications data, and geolocational information,
offers novel insights into the fabric of society. It provides a starting point for
further socio-cultural knowledge generation. And it can be used to effect massive
political, social, and economic change. As such, it qualitatively differs from other
forms of intelligence.
The current statutory regime proves ill-fitting for the type of information
involved. The government’s attempted use of FISA to authorize telephony
metadata collection fell far short of the statutory requirements. Nor did efforts to
force Internet metadata into FISA’s pen register and trap and trace provisions
fare better. In the meantime, Modern FISA is being stretched to incorporate a
wide range of social intelligence about U.S. citizens, even as Executive Order
12333 provides a broad framing for yet more collection of such sensitive
information.
One problem is that SOCINT can be used for not just ascertaining threats to
the United States but also for heading off political opposition.387 Important nodes
can be identified and neutralized, or pressured to act in certain ways. Social
networks are also vulnerable to manipulation. They are dynamic processes and
thus constantly changing and evolving. Information can be disseminated quickly
385. See
Structure,
INTELLIGENCE.GOV,
http://web.archive.org/web/20150628
204228/http://www.intelligence.gov/mission/structure.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
386. See Michael P. Noonan, Defense Intelligence Agency Expansion Must Be Closely
Monitored,
U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REPORT
(Dec.
5,
2012),
www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/05/defense-intelligence-agencyexpansion-must-be-closely-monitored.
387. See, e.g., AP, Cuban Twitter, supra note 250.
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among the members of the network. Because they lack a territorial grounding,
and instead are formed through the digital sphere, networks evolve with scant
regard for political borders or regulatory structures. Communication, moreover,
may occur instantaneously between lots of people, bringing massive human
resources to bear.
Another concern relates to the constitutional underpinning of the United
States. The Fourth Amendment was created to protect against the broad
collection of information on U.S. citizens because of the harms that could
ensue.388 SOCINT is a powerful type of data. Had the British had access to it at
the time of the Revolution, a very different outcome may have ensued. 389
Whether one takes heart from this or despairs of it, the central point cannot be
ignored: SOCINT carries with it an enormous amount of power. The rights basis
also matters. The invasion of privacy may have deleterious consequences for
values central to the United States.
Together, these considerations suggest that more careful discussion of
SOCINT takes place, before it fully evolves—not least because of the unique
challenges it poses as a matter of U.S. constitutional law. Traditional FISA
currently addresses electronic communications, physical search, pen register and
trap and trace devices, and tangible goods. For the most part, SOCINT is now
being collected under Modern FISA and Executive Order 12333. The time is ripe
for Congress to extract these programs from the current framing and to amend
FISA directly to take account of the promise—and perils—of social intelligence.

388. See supra Part IV.
389. See, e.g., Brustein, supra note 366.

